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ABSTRACT. Housing companies manage a considerable proportion of urban open green space 
in Sweden. This article explores how 62 Swedish housing companies, municipal and private, 
organise their open space maintenance and the reasons behind organisational structure. Here, 
organisational structure covers three aspects of open space maintenance: (1) whether performed 
in-house or by a contractor, (2) whether performed by local managers or circulating teams, and 
(3) whether and how residents are involved in management. The organisational structures 
varied widely among the housing companies studied. Mixed structures were common. Formal 
resident involvement processes were almost only found in municipally owned areas with local 
managers. The arguments could be derived from two general management approaches, prioritis-
ing either customer relations more or economic effi ciency. The conclusion was that management 
approach might be important in choosing organisational structure. 
KEYWORDS: Green open space; Maintenance; Organisational structure; Rental housing; Resi-
dent involvement
1. INTRODUCTION
The maintenance of urban green spaces 
concerns not only local park departments, 
but also to a large extent housing companies. 
More than one-third of dwellings in Sweden 
are rental apartments (SABO, 2007) and the 
total amount of open green spaces that be-
long to these houses was estimated to total 
28,000  hectares 20 years ago (Bucht and Pers-
son, 1987), which is a considerable proportion 
of Swedish urban green space. The total area 
of constructed parks under municipal man-
agement has been calculated to be about the 
same: 27,400 hectares (Svenska Kommunför-
bundet, 1997). This makes housing companies 
important actors in the task of providing good 
quality green open spaces for urban residents. 
For tenants, these spaces are used on an eve-
ryday basis as part of their home. 
Organisational structures and corporative 
management models have been issues for re-
search for a long time, including those in hous-
ing organisations. However, very little atten-
tion has been given to the management and 
organisation of open space maintenance. There 
are many different opinions among housing 
companies on how such maintenance should 
be organised. In this article we explore how 
a number of Swedish housing companies or-
ganise their open space maintenance and what 
arguments they give for the organisational 
structure they have chosen. 
1.1. Current trends in open space 
management in Swedish housing 
companies
According to the Swedish Association of 
Municipal Housing Companies (SABO), there 
are approximately 4.2 million dwellings in 
Sweden, of which 42% are privately owned 
homes, 18% cooperatives, 17% privately owned 
rental apartments and 22% municipal rental 
apartments (SABO, 2007). According to Turner 
(1999), the traditional system with a generally 
high standard of housing is in transition to a 
more market-orientated system with grow-
ing socio-economic differentiation. Turner and 
Whitehead (2002) mean that Swedish munici-
pal housing companies went through dramatic 
changes in the 1990s, mainly due to reduced 
governmental subsidies. Hansson and Nilsson-
Hellström (1993) and Johansson (1998) mean 
that the organisation of open space main-
tenance has also been affected and increas-
ingly diversified. However, this field is far 
from thoroughly explored and most previous 
studies have only concerned municipal/public 
housing. The literature points at three tenden-
cies among housing companies over the past 
two decades that can have infl uenced their 
organisational structure in different direc-
tions: (1) outsourcing of maintenance services; 
(2) customer orientation; and (3) a growing 
interest in self-management and other forms 
of resident involvement. These tendencies are 
described more closely below.
One crucial tendency in the rental hous-
ing sector is the outsourcing of maintenance 
tasks. In some cases housing companies pur-
chase all property management from another 
company, which in turn can use contractors 
for certain maintenance tasks (see Castell, 
2005). In other cases only some parts of prop-
erty management, such as open space mainte-
nance, are purchased from another company. 
Outsourcing has been a major trend in housing 
management in Sweden and other countries, 
and the central motive discussed has been to 
increase economic effi ciency (see e.g. Sirmans 
et al., 1999; Priemus et al., 1999; Saugeres 
and Clapham, 1999; Becker et al., 2001; Yik 
and Lai, 2005). In the United Kingdom, the 
public housing sector has even been forced into 
outsourcing from central government through 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering (Saugeres 
and Clapham, 1999). For the countries within 
the EU, general directives on the procurement 
process complement national legal systems, 
such as the public procurement act (LOU) in 
Sweden (see Ohno and Harada (2006) for an 
international comparison). A shared problem 
among several countries is that the legal sys-
tem for procurement unfortunately often leads 
to  contractors being chosen mainly on an eco-
nomic basis, with less attention to quality and 
service issues (Zavadskas and Vilutienė, 2006; 
see also Becker et al., 2001). In the Nether-
lands, many non-profi t housing associations 
have turned to performance-based mainte-
nance partnerships, where the contractor is 
consulted not only for the maintenance tasks, 
but also for planning and strategic develop-
ment (Straub and van Mossel, 2007). 
A second major tendency is the change from 
a technical property orientation to a customer 
orientation in housing management (see e.g. 
Johansson, 1998; Högberg and Högberg, 2000; 
Blomé, 2006). Companies that emphasise their 
customer orientation place a higher priority on 
personal relations with tenants and on issues 
relating to the social environment in residen-
tial areas. Customer orientation also seems to 
be a general trend in the housing management 
sector in the United Kingdom (see e.g. Spink, 
1998; Clapham et al., 2000). This tendency has 
T. Lindgren and P. Castell142
led to changes in the overall organisational 
structure in many companies. It has opened the 
way for more differentiated ways of organising 
maintenance tasks among Swedish municipal 
housing companies (Johansson, 1998), as well 
as in the European housing market as a whole 
(Priemus et al., 1999). One common implication 
of this customer orientation has been a change-
over from a centralised to a more decentralised 
decision chain, giving higher responsibilities to 
management staff directly involved with the 
daily practical maintenance work. It has be-
come more popular to have local area-based 
managers and their role has changed. The ‘new’ 
local manager role differs from the ‘traditional’ 
in having much wider responsibilities, e.g. for 
fi nances and in particular for contacts with ten-
ants (Johansson, 1998; also compare Clapham 
et al., 2000). According to Johansson (1998), 
this change of orientation and organisational 
structure in Sweden has been led primarily by 
SABO, i.e. by the public housing companies. 
A third tendency is the seemingly growing 
interest in self-management, i.e. when resi-
dents are involved in open space management 
and take over maintenance tasks themselves. 
Since the mid-1990s in particular, a number 
of self-management projects have been initi-
ated. Such projects have gained considerable 
attention among housing companies and ten-
ants’ organisations. This tendency is partly in 
line with the interest in customer relations 
and social issues described above, but it is 
also frequently connected with other motives, 
such as revitalisation of declining urban areas 
(see e.g. Alfredsson and Cars, 1996; Delsham-
mar, 2005), initiating grassroots democracy 
(see e.g. Bengtsson et al., 2003) and increas-
ing environmental awareness (see e.g. Erics-
son, 2002). Moreover, self-management has 
been promoted in government reports as a 
means of developing democracy (see e.g. Swed-
ish Government, 1997, 2000). In other coun-
tries, small and larger programmes supporting 
resident involvement in open space manage-
ment have been reported to be very successful 
(see e.g. Hawtin, 1998; Kurtz, 2001; Aalbers 
et al., 2002; Bartolomei et al., 2003; Glover 
et al., 2005). However, there have also been 
some critical voices suggesting that resident 
management is not necessarily accompanied 
by empowerment, and that it may be viewed 
as a way of housing companies escaping their 
responsibilities (see e.g. Peterman, 1996). 
With respect to previous research on resident 
involvement in open space management in 
residential areas, it could be claimed that the 
diversity and complexity of the issue have to a 
large extent been neglected. Studies have usu-
ally focused on rather well-organised and well-
established self-management groups, ignoring 
numerous processes that are of a more spon-
taneous and/or temporary character (Castell, 
2005, 2006). Moreover, such processes have 
not been mapped out systematically and they 
have not been related to the characteristics 
and motives of the housing companies. 
To sum up, previous research has brought 
some clarity regarding tendencies affecting the 
organisation of open space management with-
in housing companies and how this has devel-
oped over time. However, it has not provided 
knowledge on the frequency and distribution 
of different organisational structures, nor have 
the arguments for the choice of organisation-
al structure been studied specifi cally. To our 
knowledge, this study is the fi rst to actually 
map out the frequency and distribution of dif-
ferent organisational structures among hous-
ing companies, to study their motives and to 
analyse how these relate to different manage-
ment approaches. 
1.2. Design and implementation 
of the study
The organisational structures of housing 
companies were mapped out through a series 
of telephone interviews with managers and di-
rectors of 62 housing companies, located in the 
province of Skåne and in the city of Göteborg 
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in Sweden. The sample refl ected the changing 
conditions of a region with a variety of mu-
nicipalities: small to medium; rural and urban; 
in decline and in growth. It also included two 
larger cities (Göteborg with more than half a 
million inhabitants and Malmö with almost 
300 000), coping with rapid expansion and 
transition from a manufacturing to knowledge 
economy, as well as socio-economic segrega-
tion and stigmatisation of certain residential 
areas. The 62 companies included all mem-
bers of SABO1 in the region of Skåne and all 
companies – municipal and private – owning 
or managing at least 200 apartments in Göte-
borg. This amounted to almost 40% of the to-
tal number of rental apartments in Skåne and 
75% of those in Göteborg, see Figure 1. 
In the interviews, one or several employ-
ees (directors, managers and/or operational 
staff, depending on company size and struc-
ture) of each company were asked about how 
open space management is organised and 
about the benefi ts and disadvantages of dif-
ferent organisational structures. They were 
also asked whether there were any examples 
of self-management or other forms of resident 
involvement in their housing areas, and how 
the company viewed such initiatives. Detailed 
notes were taken during these telephone in-
terviews. The reason for not recording and 
transcribing the interviews in full was that 
we believed that recording would have risked 
making interviewees more reluctant to provide 
information and would probably even have 
discouraged some from participating. Instead, 
we attempted to include all companies listed 
in the survey and obtain information under 
rather relaxed circumstances. Each interview 
lasted for about 10-60 minutes. The informa-
tion went through several steps of analysis, 
using spreadsheets. Each company’s organisa-
tional structure was categorised in accordance 
with a model described in section two. Data on 
company size, ownership and geographical lo-
cation were used to analyse the frequency and 
distribution of different organisational struc-
tures. All arguments were then listed, rear-
ranged and grouped according to the kind of 
organisational structure they supported, after 
which different interpretations and possible 
thematisations were elaborated and discussed 
within the research team. These results can be 
seen in the last section of the paper. 
Figure 1. Total dwelling stocks in (a) the Skåne region and (b) Göteborg, divided into four categories
Coloured parts are included in the survey
_____________
1 90% of all Swedish municipal housing companies are 
members of SABO (SABO, 2007).
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1.2.1. About the companies in the survey
Göteborg’s fi ve municipal housing compa-
nies work in the same corporate group and to-
gether they own about half the city’s 139,000 
rental apartments. The two smallest compa-
nies are organised to take care of one subur-
ban district each. The other three each man-
age around 20,000 apartments, spread around 
the city. The largest municipal housing com-
pany in the Skåne region is of a similar size, 
while the smallest only has 130 dwellings to 
manage. The three largest private companies 
in Göteborg manage about 5,000 apartments 
each (although two of these have since amal-
gamated into one company that owns almost 
10,000 apartments in Göteborg). As can be 
seen in Figure 2, the number of individual 
apartments per company varies from about 
3,000 down to below 200. 
1.2.2. Model of organisational structures
Johansson (1998) has pointed out that there 
is a strong differentiation among housing com-
panies in the organisation of work. However, 
little has been done to conceptualise these dif-
ferences and there have been no attempts to 
map them out. In this paper, organisational 
structure is used as a concept for how housing 
companies organise their open space mainte-
nance. It covers three aspects: 
(1) Whether the maintenance is carried out by 
in-house staff or by an external contractor;
Figure 2. Housing companies in the survey, each represented by a bar in the diagram, the length 
indicating the number of apartments owned. Colours indicate if publicly or privately owned, letters G 
and S at the bottom indicate which region, and dots indicate if there are examples of formalised 
involvement processes within the company.
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(2) Whether there are locally based mainte-
nance staff or a more centralised organ-
isation with teams circulating between 
several areas;
(3) Whether or not there are examples of 
self-management or other forms of resi-
dent involvement.
These three aspects refl ect the three ten-
dencies in the Swedish housing market out-
lined in the introduction. The first aspect 
relates to a commonly described concern in 
practice – whether it is better to carry out 
the maintenance work within the company or 
contract it in from a separate fi rm. This has 
been discussed in relation to housing man-
agement previously (see e.g. Sirmans et al., 
1999; Persson, 2005; Blomé, 2006). This as-
pect roughly describes the formal relations of 
the maintenance organisation but it gives lit-
tle information on how the maintenance work 
is structured and carried out. It also provides 
no information on how responsibilities are al-
located among the management and mainte-
nance staff. These issues are better covered 
by the second aspect, which describes the geo-
graphical and task-wise distribution of respon-
sibilities among the staff. It concerns levels of 
specialisation and decentralisation in the or-
ganisation. The third aspect included in the 
framework is the occurrence and forms of resi-
dent involvement in open space maintenance. 
Resident involvement processes are perhaps an 
area-based phenomenon rather than a part of 
a company’s organisational structure, as they 
depend on much more than a strategic decision 
in the executive board of the company. Most 
obviously, they depend on the residents’ will 
and engagement. However, it has been shown 
that it is not unusual for housing companies to 
have an explicit strategy to promote and sup-
port involvement initiatives and even actively 
initiate such processes (as the case reported in 
Lindgren, 2005). 
2. THE PRACTICE OF DIFFERENT 
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES
This section further describes the three 
main aspects of organisational structure, draw-
ing on the empirical fi ndings. It also provides a 
presentation of the frequency and distribution 
of different organisational structures among 
the companies studied and relates it to the 
size of the company and whether it is private 
or public.
2.1. (1) In-house and contractor 
management
The fi rst aspect of the organisational struc-
ture is whether the maintenance tasks are 
performed within the housing company’s own 
organisation or outsourced to a contractor. 
When the housing company’s own employees 
perform the tasks, this is referred to here as 
in-house management2. The opposite situation, 
contractor management3, is when maintenance 
tasks, or property management as a whole, are 
performed by staff from a fi rm of contractors. 
This is commonly known as outsourcing, even 
though the strict defi nition of this term is de-
bated (see e.g. Bhagwati et al., 2004). 
A mixture of in-house and contractor man-
agement can be used within the same housing 
company. For example, some of the companies 
studied had their own staff managing some 
housing areas and contractors managing other 
areas. Another common mixed form was when 
companies had their own staff, but hired con-
tractors for certain tasks, such as lawn-mow-
ing or hedge-trimming. Altogether, this gives 
rise to four categories: (1) in-house manage-
ment, (2) in-house management but contractor 
_____________
2 In-house management, as used here, corresponds to 
what e.g. Sirmans et al. (1999) denote ‘own manage-
ment’.
3 Contractor management, as used here, corresponds 
to what e.g. Sirmans et al. (1999) denote ‘third-party 
management.
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for certain areas, (3) in-house management but 
contractor for certain tasks, and (4) contractor 
management.
The survey revealed that there was a rel-
atively even distribution between in-house 
management (24 companies) and contractor 
management (19). It was also common to have 
in-house management combined with contrac-
tors for certain tasks (15). It was less frequent 
to have contractors only in certain areas (4). 
There was no obvious connection between com-
pany size and in-house or contractor manage-
ment (see Figure 3). Outsourcing was possi-
bly the most common option for medium-sized 
companies, as in the size range 800-2000 apart-
ments, 50% of companies used contractors for 
all their open space maintenance work, while 
the fi gures for the smaller and larger compa-
nies were 19% and 17% respectively. There was 
no apparent difference between municipal and 
private housing companies in this regard.
2.2. (2) Local managers 
and circulating teams
The second aspect is whether there are lo-
cally based maintenance staff or a more cen-
tralised organisation with teams circulating 
between several areas. The way of organising 
the management into rather decentralised, 
small and locally based units is here referred 
to as the local manager system4. The local 
manager (in Swedish often named husvärd 
or bovärd) is a representative of the housing 
company or the contractor who has full respon-
sibility for a smaller area (normally 200 to 400 
apartments). As the local managers work in 
the local area, they can be addressed face-to-
face for different kinds of concerns by the ten-
ants. The role of the local manager can vary. In 
some companies in the study, this role focused 
more on social issues and customer relations. 
In other cases the role was mostly technical, 
to plan and perform the maintenance tasks. 
Some companies had local area offi ces open for 
the residents to visit. Other companies instead 
had a central offi ce for customer services. It 
was also common to have combinations of local 
area offi ces and central customer service.
Circulating teams of maintenance staff 
move around during the season between differ-
ent housing areas5. This is a more centralised 
type of organisation. The staff are not perma-
nently present in one area but visit the areas 
with various frequencies to carry out their 
tasks. A circulating team system does not nec-
essarily imply that the management units are 
larger in terms of number of apartments than 
when there are local managers. Small hous-
ing companies that have the same number 
of apartments as the common local manager 
area may still use the circulating team option 
if the houses are spread out and do not form 
a coherent area unit. Having local managers 
would not be a relevant alternative for these 
companies since the units would be too small 
and therefore too costly to maintain. 
Some companies in the study mixed local 
managers and circulating teams. One way of 
mixing was to have local managers in some 
areas and circulating teams in others. Another 
was that local managers took care of certain 
tasks and circulating teams took on other 
tasks in the same area. Sometimes the local 
staff performed regular everyday tasks, such 
as cleaning of open spaces, while the circulat-
ing teams mowed grass or did tasks demanding 
more specialised skills, such as tree-cutting. 
More companies (although generally small-
er in size) relied only on circulating teams (30 
companies) than relied only on local managers 
(17 companies). Combinations were also com-
_____________
4 The local manager system is comparable with what 
Sommerville and Steele (1999) defi ne as the building 
management model.
_____________
5 The circulating team system is more in line with what 
Sommerville and Steele (1999) call the area manage-
ment model.
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mon – about one-quarter (15) of the compa-
nies used both local managers and circulating 
teams. There appeared to be some differences 
between private and municipal companies (see 
Figure 3). Local managers, often in combina-
tion with in-house management, were more 
common among municipal housing companies, 
while circulating teams were more typical of 
private companies. Local managers dominated 
among larger municipal companies (with 8,000 
apartments or more), while among the small-
est companies (with 500 apartments or less), 
circulating teams were standard. This may be 
explained by the fact that most small compa-
nies had their properties spread out and not in 
coherent areas of appropriate size for a local 
manager unit. 
2.3. (3) Self-management and other 
forms of resident involvement
The third tendency mentioned in the intro-
duction was the interest in self-management, 
which has led to a number of local initiatives 
involving residents in open space maintenance. 
There are many diverse forms of resident in-
volvement in open space maintenance. They 
range from informal, small-scale individual 
initiatives to thoroughly organised groups with 
full control over the entire management proc-
ess. Regarding the responsibility and autono-
my of resident involvement, three main types 
can be distinguished, as listed in Table 1.
Each of these three types can have sub-cat-
egories depending on the kind of compensation 
the residents receive and whether or not there 
are formal arrangements such as contracts 
between the group and the housing company 
(Castell, 2006). 
The study revealed that there were a lim-
ited number of self-management processes of 
the high autonomy kind and likewise of the su-
pervised self-management kind (see Figure 3). 
As there was a high uncertainty regarding 
the number of informal involvement processes 
(those processes were often not recognised by 
the central management staff), only formalised 
processes are included in the fi gures. 
It was diffi cult to identify any specifi c area 
conditions that are prerequisites for or favour-
able for the presence of formal resident involve-
ment processes. The areas where involvement 
processes existed showed a great variety in 
terms of building age and spatial confi guration 
of the houses, as well as socio-economic indica-
tors such as demographic structure, unemploy-
ment, income levels, ethnic distribution, edu-
cation levels, share of households receiving so-
cial benefi ts, etc. (see Castell, 2005). One clear 
pattern, however, was that formal resident 
involvement processes existed exclusively in 
areas managed by municipal housing compa-
nies. Possible reasons for this are: (a) that the 
municipal companies in general are large, and 
that size is important for the ability to initiate 
and support different kind of local processes; 
(b) that there is a long tradition of collabora-
tion between the municipal housing companies 
and the Union of Tenants, a collaboration that 
has resulted in central and local agreements 
Table 1. Types of resident involvement6 











lower level of autonomy
C Garden group Only complementing 
the housing company’s 
default maintenance of 
the yard
_____________
6 Compared with to the typology of landlord-tenant 
agreements suggested by Somerville and Steele 
(1999), the self-management processes identifi ed ex-
emplify cooperative tenant management, while the 
processes of supervised self-management and garden 
groups are more of partnerships.
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on resident infl uence; and (c) that municipal 
housing companies, at least traditionally, have 
often had political commitments to social re-
sponsibility inscribed in their objectives. 
Another fi nding was that formal resident 
involvement processes mainly appeared in 
companies with local manager systems. This 
supports what previous case studies have 
suggested – that local managers often play a 
crucial role in initiating and facilitating local 
involvement processes (see e.g. Alfredsson and 
Cars, 1996; Bengtsson et al., 2003). 
Figure 3. Summary of the number of companies in different categories
Bar height indicates the size of each company (logarithmic scale). Bar colour indicates public or private 
ownership. Letters on bars indicate location (S = Skåne; G = Göteborg). The red circles represent where 
examples of formalised self-management processes are found. A: Self-management; B: Supervised self-
management; C: Garden group (see Castell, 2006).
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3. ARGUMENTS BEHIND CHOICE OF 
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE
In this section, arguments for choosing cer-
tain organisational structures are presented, 
based on the interviews with directors, manag-
ers and maintenance staff.
3.1. In-house – for customer 
relations and control
Common arguments for in-house manage-
ment were that it matters for company image 
and customer relations. One interviewee de-
scribed it as a safety issue for the residents 
that the on-site staff wear the company brand 
on their working clothes. Another saw it as 
trust-building that there is continuity and 
clarity in contacts with tenants. Several other 
arguments can be associated with the possibil-
ity to control the management process. A very 
concrete example, which several companies 
brought up, was the advantage of being able 
to redirect the maintenance staff when an un-
foreseen situation occurs. It was reported that 
it is hard to demand other duties from a con-
tractor than those defi ned in advance in the 
contract, but in-house staff can easily be given 
new tasks if necessary. Another advantage 
mentioned is that the decision-making chain is 
shorter with in-house operational staff working 
directly for the management executives. This 
may give a faster response to new directives. 
When it comes to economics, it was debatable 
whether in-house management is cheaper or 
more expensive than outsourcing. Some advo-
cates of in-house management claimed that it 
is cost-neutral or even cheaper when the ben-
efi ts of better control are included. These inter-
viewees also believe that it gives better incen-
tives for development of long-term cost-saving 
improvements, e.g. by changing the vegetation 
present or redesigning the area. Others stated 
that it is very diffi cult to calculate and predict 
the costs of an in-house management system. 
Another disadvantage mentioned with in-
house management is the problem of seasonal 
variations in workload. This has to be resolved 
by inventing a lot of tasks for staff during the 
winter or by employing seasonal workers dur-
ing the summer.
To sum up, the main arguments for in-
house management were that it gave good 
customer relations, a trustworthy image and 
a high degree of control of the management 
process. Opinion differed on whether it was 
economically effi cient or not. The main chal-
lenge seemed to be how to deal with the sea-
sonal variations in workload.
3.2. Contractor – for cost-effectiveness 
and calculability
The main arguments for outsourcing con-
cerned saving money in different ways. One 
was that some costly investments could be 
avoided, according to some of the companies. 
For example, they did not have to buy ma-
chines for specialised tasks, e.g. lawn-mow-
ing. Another saving mentioned was that that 
some employer obligations could be avoided. 
Instead, the contractor bears the costs and 
risks of employing the operational staff. More-
over, the task specialisation of the contractor 
may make it more cost-effective than in-house 
management, as some of the companies had 
concluded. According to some interviewees, 
the main disadvantage with outsourcing is 
associated with the contracting process. One 
problem is the diffi culties involved in formu-
lating good measurable criteria for open space 
quality. This was said to need high expertise 
and to be quite time-consuming. In-house ad-
vocates claimed that there is a clear pattern 
that money goes before quality in this proc-
ess. Some complained over the legal system 
where public institutions, such as municipal 
housing companies, have to choose the cheap-
est tender if several meet their defi ned criteria 
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in the procurement process 7. One interviewee 
claimed that a great advantage with contrac-
tors is that the client knows in advance what 
they are getting and exactly what it costs. 
Another interviewee was frustrated over the 
variable quality and the diffi culties in know-
ing in advance what will be provided. It was 
also said that with a contractor, the staff could 
not be given new tasks outside the contract 
without extra payment being demanded. In 
contradiction to the lack of control argument, 
however, one manager argued that it is easier 
to put pressure on a contractor to get some-
thing done than to put pressure on in-house 
staff.
To sum up, cost-effectiveness was the main 
argument for choosing a contractor. Another 
argument was the avoidance of employer ob-
ligations. It was disputed whether contract 
work improved calculability, whether it was 
more fl exible and how it affected the quality. 
The main challenge was clearly the contract-
ing process, lack of expertise within the com-
panies and the legal system, said to lead to low 
costs but poor quality. See Table 2.
3.3. Local manager – for personal 
contacts with tenants 
Making closer contacts and being well-
known among the tenants were the main mo-
tive for having local managers. The benefi t 
with this, according to some interviewees, is 
that tenants know who is in charge with local 
manager and thereby they can easily address 
him/her over the telephone or by walking down 
to the local area offi ce if such exists. Common 
arguments for having local managers were 
thus that it is trust-building and that it gives 
good service opportunities for the residents. 
One company that had changed to circulating 
teams said that this was not popular, since the 
tenants had been very satisfi ed with the lo-
cal managers. Likewise, to be locally situated 
was said to be positive for the working situa-
tion of the operational staff. Some of the local 
managers interviewed expressed their content 
at being well-known and having frequent per-
sonal contacts with the residents. A couple of 
the housing companies also saw an advantage 
in having local managers as regards tenants’ 
Table 2. Summary of arguments for and against in-house and contractor management
In-house Contractor
Benefi ts Continuity and clarity in contacts with 
tenants is trust-building
Important for the company’s image
Own staff can be given new tasks
Better control of staff and work process
Incentives for development of cost-saving 
improvements
Avoids costly investments in own machines
Clients know in advance what they will get 
and what it costs
No employer obligations
Reshaping and reorganisation easy
Easier to put pressure on contractors than 
on in-house staff
Better quality due to specialist skills
Disadvantages Need to have seasonal employees or to in-
vent a lot of tasks during the low-season 
(winter)
Harder to control the costs
Needs time and expertise to formulate good 
contracts
Less responsibility-taking and loyalty
_____________
7 As decreed in the public procurement act, Lag om Of-
fentlig Upphandling, (Swedish Government, 1992).
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opinions on the quality of services delivered. 
One white-collar employee reported that the 
tenants might have opinions on things but 
never complaints about the local managers. 
This suggests that having well-known local 
managers also gives an impression of better 
service, despite questionable technical quality. 
The other side of being well-known is that the 
company knows the tenants well. Some com-
panies saw this as an advantage, as having 
known representatives may simplify contact 
with large groups of tenants. Thus, the local 
manager can contact the most interested ten-
ants to provide information or feedback on 
certain questions, in the hope that this will 
spread to the rest through them. Another ar-
gument raised by an employee working in a 
team of local managers was that their pres-
ence brings some calm and safety to the area. 
For example, no young people dared to drive 
their motorbikes in the yards before the end 
of the working shift. 
Arguments against having local managers 
were mainly economic, but also connected with 
the expected technical quality of maintenance. 
One opinion was that having local managers 
was costly and there were several different 
reasons given as to why. One reason was that 
local offi ces and maintenance equipment are 
needed in each area. Another was that the 
work often becomes ineffi cient due to the con-
stant disruptions by residents who stop by to 
talk to the staff. However, one company made 
the point that local managers were good from 
an effi ciency point of view, since they had an 
individual responsibility. After organising a lo-
cal manager system, this company could eas-
ily relate every result to a specifi c employee’s 
work. This, they said, was benefi cial for their 
ability to manage effi ciently. Continuity of the 
local managers was stated to be both positive 
and negative. One positive aspect, although 
only indirectly stated, can be that the continu-
ity can give a more constant quality of main-
tenance than circulating teams, as mainte-
nance intervals can be shortened and there is 
someone continuously checking the conditions. 
Becoming well-known and trusted among the 
tenants was seen as positive from a customer 
relations perspective. The negative point was 
that it may lead to local staff getting bogged 
down in routines. This could lead to a loss 
of creativity and enthusiasm in their work, 
as one maintenance worker explained. Some 
companies claimed that it is diffi cult to fi nd 
people with the right skills to employ as local 
managers. Several had experienced problems 
with keeping the same staff when the focus 
changed from technical issues and the physi-
cal environment to social relations with ten-
ants and between neighbours. This suggests 
that the realisation of such a change is quite 
dependent on the individual local managers. 
To sum up, arguments for local managers 
were fi rst and foremost connected with the re-
lations to tenants. Local managers were said 
to have a good effect on how the tenants expe-
rienced their services, the working situation of 
operational staff, the company’s image among 
the tenants and the local social environment 
in the housing areas. The effi ciency of local 
managers was disputed, as were the effects of 
having the same local manager in an area for 
a long time.
3.4. Circulating team – for specialisation 
and effi ciency
Having a circulating team was said to im-
prove effi ciency in several ways. One argument 
was that resources are optimally utilised when 
individuals with various specialist skills work 
together in a circulating team. Others claimed 
that the effi ciency of circulating teams was be-
cause they make it easier to direct efforts to 
where they are most needed, which gives fl ex-
ibility in the prioritisation between different 
areas. The circulating team has the resources 
to ‘give an extra hand’ when needed, it was 
said. Another effi ciency aspect raised was that 
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circulating teams may focus more on mainte-
nance of the physical environment, as they are 
less involved in social issues in the neighbour-
hood. Others believed that the maintenance 
levels might fl uctuate more than with local 
managers, who can provide more constant 
maintenance. This can be seen as both posi-
tive and negative. One informant reported that 
everything looked great just after the circulat-
ing team had been there, but that the area of-
ten got weedy before they came back again. A 
few of the companies that had chosen to have 
circulating teams saw working in a group as 
positive for the employees. For the group to 
function well, it was reported that the team 
leaders are particularly important. One com-
pany claimed that it was hard to fi nd the right 
person for this position. In their case, they took 
the risk of converting to a circulating team sys-
tem because the team leader was well-known 
from working as a local manager. However, it 
was still considered a risk to have a circulating 
group, since that person could resign. 
To sum up, effi ciency was the most frequent 
motive for choosing circulating teams and 
there were several arguments given: specialist 
skills can be used in an optimal way, resources 
can be directed to where they are most needed, 
and there is less risk of time being wasted in 
discussion with tenants. Another argument 
was that it was good for the employees. There 
were different opinions on the risk of fl uctuat-
ing quality of upkeep. A stated disadvantage 
was the problem of fi nding good team leaders. 
See Table 3.
3.5. Self-management and other forms of 
resident involvement
In agreement with what several previous 
studies have concluded, the main arguments 
for involving residents in the management 
were about social issues rather than about 
improving the physical environment. Accord-
ing to companies advocating self-management, 
this system can lead to a friendlier atmosphere 
in the area and increased social cohesion. As 
one chief manager explained, organised social 
activities can be very valuable for the resi-
dents, especially for those who live alone and 
Table 3. Summary of arguments for and against local manager and circulating teams
Local manager Circulating team
Benefi ts Tenants satisfi ed with personal contacts
Effi ciency in the landlord’s contacts with 
tenants
Nice for staff to know and be known by 
the tenants
Better order and reduced risk for 
vandalism during working hours
Individual responsibilities facilitates 
performance control
More constant upkeep
Effi cient work with skills specialisation 
and fl exibility
Instant improvement when the team had 
been there
Disadvantages Too many contacts with tenants slow up 
the work
Diffi cult to recruit enough local managers 
with the right skills
Managers get stuck in routines and lose 
inspiration
Costly
Important to fi nd skilled team leaders
Might get weedy between maintenance 
occasions
Open Space Management in Residential Areas – How it is Organised and Why 153
lack strong support networks. However, some 
interviewees also pointed out that resident 
involvement may well trigger conflicts and 
conspiracies among neighbours. According to 
these interviewees, it is very diffi cult to reach 
consensus when residents are given the power 
to decide how the open spaces should be man-
aged. There can be contradictory opinions and 
there might be those who feel disregarded. As 
people have different needs and preferences, 
it can be problematic to let a smaller group 
gain too much infl uence over the common re-
sources, it was said. Some raised the issue 
that self-management can be perceived as the 
tenants stealing the job from maintenance 
workers, which was denied by others. There 
were also arguments for and against resident 
involvement in connection with the quality of 
the physical environment. Some claimed that 
the environment became more diversifi ed and 
nicer and that elements could be added that 
were impossible if the company performed the 
maintenance work without the contribution 
of residents – it would cost too much replace 
the time and efforts invested by involved resi-
dents. On the other hand, others thought that 
the work of residents did not always contrib-
ute positively to the physical environment. The 
tenants might fail to live up to their ambitions 
due to laziness or lack of skills, it was said. 
Some had experienced that fl owerbeds main-
tained by residents had become weedy and 
that shoddy fences had been constructed by 
unskilled tenants. It was also said that the 
tenants’ ideas of how to redesign their yard 
could be in opposition to the overall design con-
cepts of the area or the company. For example, 
one manager described it as horribly tasteless 
when a group of residents at one yard painted 
the grey concrete walls in blue. There were 
also different opinions among the companies 
when it came to the economic effects of self-
management. Many of the interviewees argued 
that there are great savings, since involvement 
initiatives may reduce vandalism. Money was 
also said to be saved by the housing company 
not having to do as much work in areas where 
residents were actively involved in the mainte-
nance. However, others argued that it is very 
time-consuming for the staff to facilitate the 
involvement processes as it can involve a lot 
of meetings, discussions, encouragement and 
pressure. One stated problem was that the in-
volvement processes often depended on a few 
real enthusiasts and that it was often diffi cult 
to recruit new people. The processes are thus 
sensitive to changes in the social composition 
of the neighbourhood and hard to formalise 
and sustain in the long-term. Some companies 
believed that professional project coordination 
is needed to make it work well, which they 
said only the largest companies can afford. 
One company pointed out that they used self-
management as a successful branding of the 
company. This shows that resident involve-
ment might be important for the image of the 
company. Some interviewees saw it as a goal 
in itself for the tenants to have more direct in-
fl uence over their living environment. A point 
raised by some companies was that it can be 
very convenient for the managers to address 
the tenants involved as representative contact 
persons for the group of tenants. 
To sum up, the main arguments for pro-
moting self-management were connected with 
company relations to tenants and the relations 
between tenants. There were also arguments 
connected with economic effi ciency, of which 
some were positive and some negative. In-
creased diversity of the physical environment 
and variation in maintenance levels following 
on from the involvement process were consid-
ered both positive and negative. The main dis-
advantage was the diffi culty in initiating and 
formalising the self-management processes. 
See Table 4.
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3.6. A comment on changing 
the organisational structure
Many managers interviewed in the study ex-
pressed satisfaction with their current organi-
sational structure, even though there were also 
those who wanted to change the structures in 
different ways. In general, they raised both ad-
vantages and disadvantages with different or-
ganisational structures. Although there might 
be other organisational structures that may be 
more benefi cial in the long term, change was 
considered a tough and costly process. Several 
interviewees argued e.g. that ‘we have always 
done it like this and we see no reason to try 
something else’. However, for some of the com-
panies interviewed, the change from in-house 
staff to contractor was rather described as a 
smooth and cheap solution, as they could avoid 
employing new staff or expensive investments. 
Still, any change can be seen as a risk invest-
ment, as it is diffi cult to know how a new or-
ganisation will function in practice. 
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This study confirmed that the organisa-
tional structures among Swedish housing com-
panies were very differentiated, as has been 
suggested by previous reports based on a few 
examples (see e.g. Johansson 1998; Blomé, 
2006). The differentiation of organisational 
structures tells us that none of the tenden-
cies presented in the beginning of this article 
(outsourcing, customer orientation and inter-
est in self-management) dominates completely. 
All tendencies seem to have infl uenced some 
companies but not others. The practice of us-
Table 4. Summary of arguments for and against self-management and management 
without resident involvement
Self-management Management without resident involvement
Benefi ts Friendly social atmosphere 
Nicer and more diverse environment
Reduced vandalism
Reduced costs for the company – input 
of new labour resources
Simplifi ed contacts with tenants
Tenants have more infl uence over their 
living environment
Improves the image of the company
More professional results in the physical 
environment
No resources wasted on unsuccessful 
involvement processes
More predictable
Disadvantages Risk for confl icts between tenants 
Risk for non-professional and 
mismatched changes
Dependency on few real enthusiasts – 
hard to recruit enough people
Takes time and commitment from 
managers
Need for good facilitation – project 
leading
The benefi ts of coordinated area planning 
are lost
Risk for perceived stealing of work from 
employees
Diffi cult to know the residents’ opinions
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ing contractors for open space maintenance 
is common in all kinds of housing companies, 
although the largest and smallest seem to fa-
vour in-house organisations. This can be taken 
as a sign that outsourcing is a widely adopted 
strategy. It can also be concluded that decen-
tralised organisations with local managers are 
common, but not as common as circulating 
teams to take care of open space maintenance. 
Perhaps not entirely refl ecting the tendency for 
customer orientation8, local manager systems 
seem to be based on a belief in getting closer 
relations to the tenants. Even though there 
seems to be an increasing interest in resident 
involvement, this study shows that it is still a 
relatively marginal phenomenon. The overall 
impression is that the conditions do not exist 
for self-management to become a dominant or-
ganisational structure. 
The previous section described how different 
kinds of arguments supported different kinds 
of organisational structures. Even though the 
informants in some cases had contradictory 
ideas of what outcomes could be expected from 
certain organisational structures, it was also 
possible to outline some general patterns. Two 
different general approaches to management 
can be traced through an analysis of the sug-
gested motives: 
(a) Optimising customer relations and fo-
cusing on social vitalisation; 
(b) Optimising cost-effectiveness and the 
technical quality of upkeep and focusing 
on the physical environment. 
The two approaches are not necessarily 
contradictory; instead they are often combined 
with varying emphasis. However, they may in-
fl uence how the housing companies organise 
their open space maintenance (see Table 5). 
The key arguments for in-house manage-
ment lie within the fi rst general approach, 
with the focus on social issues and customer 
relations. In contrast, most arguments given 
for choosing a contractor are more in line with 
the second general approach, focusing more on 
cost-effectiveness and the quality of upkeep. 
However, the motivation arguments were not 
perfectly consistent. For example, some compa-
nies claimed that in-house management leads 
to both cost-effectiveness and good quality up-
keep. Other studies support the conclusion that 
outsourcing of housing management services 
follows a logic of cost-savings and economic ef-
fi ciency rather than social commitments and 
customer orientation (see e.g. Sirmans et al., 
1999; Becker et al., 2001). 
When it came to local manager versus circu-
lating teams, there was a relatively clear differ-
entiation in the two general management ap-
proaches. The main arguments for having local 
managers were mainly connected with the fi rst 
approach. The companies with local managers 
often expressed a need to have a higher focus 
on social issues and close relations between 
company and residents. Those with circulating 
teams related their choice more to economic ef-
fi ciency and the physical environment, which 
falls within the second approach. Johansson 
(1998) argues that local staff can be more cost-
Table 5. The two general management approaches 

























8 Customer orientation is not necessarily connected 
with decentralised organisational structures. It may 
also involve centralised structures, such as effi cient 
call centre services and tenant questionnaires.
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effective than contracting specialists to do the 
tasks. Even though the specialists would do 
them faster, it costs more because of the time 
taken to contact them and for them to travel. 
In this study, however, effi ciency was not a 
main argument for having local managers. 
Supporting resident involvement, the third 
aspect of organisational structure, seems to be 
mainly about trying to optimise customer rela-
tions and social outcomes. Some companies did 
point out that there might be benefi ts in terms 
of cost savings and improvements of the physi-
cal environment. However, these arguments 
were not central for their decision to support 
resident involvement and were disputed by 
others. 
The following aggregated model, developed 
from the arguments presented by housing 
companies in this study, can give a generalised 
understanding of the arguments for different 
organisational structures.
However, it is far from easy to separate the 
two general approaches as distinct strategies. 
In reality, both social/relations and economic/
technical issues are important for every hous-
ing company. Most companies had organisa-
tional structures that involved combined ap-
proaches; mixes of different kinds were very 
common, among larger and smaller as well 
as public and private companies. Only a mi-
nor proportion of the companies studied used 
combinations associated exclusively with one 
approach, e.g. in-house/local manager or con-
tractor/circulating team (see Figure 3). For 
small companies, in-house management with 
circulating teams was the most common or-
ganisational structure. In reality, the social/
relations and economic/technical issues are 
also partly interrelated. Good customer rela-
tions and a friendly social environment can be 
seen as means for cost-effective management 
and tidy yards, just as tidiness and effi cient 
use of available resources can be a basis for 
improved social relations. The social/relations 
and the economic/technical alignments can be 
interpreted as two rhetorical lines of argumen-
tation rather than as motives. It is worthy of 
note that even representatives from municipal 
housing companies well-known for ambitious 
social engagement sometimes made the point 
that the only incentive for their social commit-
ment was to make more profi t. Every company 
seemed eager to express their concern about 
being economically profitable, independent 
of whether their general approach was more 
towards social/relation or effi ciency/technical 
issues. In a way, profi tability appeared to be 
the most fundamental motive, or at least the 
‘end-line argument’ for all standpoints, wheth-
er about upkeep quality, customer relations, 
environment, social responsibility, democracy, 
etc. These approaches can also reveal deeper 
meanings when studied in more detail. In 
analyses of housing management policy and 
practice, British researchers have concluded 
that even though managers are encouraged to 
involve tenants in decision-making and man-
agement, there are also dominant paternalistic 
discourses on how to guide the tenants into 
appropriate behaviours (Haworth and Manzi, 
1999; Saugeres and Clapham, 1999; Saugeres, 
2000). In-depth studies could provide more 
knowledge on the deeper meanings behind 
these approaches in Sweden. 
The many mixed organisational structures 
among the companies might also suggest that 
the choice of organisational structure is not 
only a matter of approach. The real situation 
is complex and diverse and the choice of or-
ganisational structure may depend on many 
different factors. The size of the company, the 
location and types of housing areas, the skills 
and routines among the staff may all be im-
portant. Even though such particular factors 
play a fundamental role, the choice of organi-
sational structure may also be a matter of 
‘interest’ or a general management approach. 
Such an approach may be weighted more or 
less towards customer relations or economic 
effi ciency. Some questions raised during this 
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investigation that deserve more attention in 
future studies are how organisational struc-
ture for open space management relates to 
overall company organisational structure and 
its general objectives; how tenants view dif-
ferent organisational structures and how it 
affects their satisfaction; how organisational 
structures change over time; and how the 
process of choosing an organisational structure 
functions. 
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SANTRAUKA
ATVIRŲ PLOTŲ TVARKYMAS GYVENAMOSIOSE TERITORIJOSE – 
KAIP IR KODĖL TAI ORGANIZUOJAMA 
Therese LINDGREN, Pål CASTELL
Švedijos miestuose nemažą dalį atvirų žaliųjų plotų tvarko namų administravimo įmonės. Šiame straipsny-
je nagrinėjama, kaip 62 (savivaldybių ir privačios) namų administravimo įmonės organizuoja atvirų plotų 
priežiūrą Švedijoje ir kokios priežastys lemia organizacinę struktūrą. Čia organizacinė struktūra apima tris 
atvirų plotų priežiūros aspektus: (1) plotus tvarko pačios ar samdo kitus, (2) tvarko vietiniai vadybininkai ar 
laikinos komandos, (3) ar prie tvarkymo prisideda ir kaip prisideda gyventojai. Nagrinėtose namų adminis-
travimo įmonėse rasta labai skirtingų organizacinių struktūrų. Mišrios struktūros populiariausios. Formalūs 
gyventojų įtraukimo procesai aptikti beveik išskirtinai tik savivaldybėms priklausančiose zonose su vietiniais 
tvarkytojais. Įrodymų buvo galima gauti iš dviejų pagrindinių vadybos požiūrių, prioritetą suteikiant ryšiams 
su klientais arba ekonominiam efektyvumui. Prieita prie išvados, kad vadybos požiūris gali būti svarbus 
renkantis organizacinę struktūrą.
Zavadskas, E.K. and Vilutienė, T. (2006) A multiple 
criteria evaluation of multi-family apartment 
block’s maintenance contractors: I-Model for 
maintenance contractor evaluation and the de-
termination of its selection criteria, Building 
and Environment, 41(5), pp. 621–632.
T. Lindgren and P. Castell160
